














INDIAN COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 





Section I: Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
Section II:  Stylized Facts and Preliminary Evidence................................................... 5 
II A:  Indian Policy Framework ...................................................................................... 5 
II B: Performance of Indian Manufacturing.................................................................... 9 
Section III:  Evidence from Enterprise Surveys .......................................................... 12 
Section IV:  Econometric Analysis................................................................................ 16 
IV A: Construction of Variables ................................................................................... 16 
IVB: Empirical Results from the ASI Data................................................................... 18 
IV C: Econometric Framework..................................................................................... 20 
IV D: Robustness of Results ......................................................................................... 28 




List of Charts 
 
Chart 1 a : Sectoral Shares in GDP, India........................................................................... 1 
Chart 1 b : Sectoral Contribution to Indian GDP Growth, 1951-2007............................... 2 
Chart 2 a : Cumulative Share of Industries Delicensed...................................................... 6 
Chart 2 b: Average Nominal Rate of Protection, 1988 to 1998.......................................... 6 
Chart  1: Infrastructure Investment (% of GDP), China and India..................................... 8 
Chart  2: Performance of Indian Manufacturing............................................................... 10 
Chart  3: Obstacles for Operations and Growth................................................................ 13 
Chart 4:  Areas for Improvement...................................................................................... 15 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Pre- and Post-reform Performance of Indian Manufacturing............................. 11 
Table 2: Single Most Important Obstacle for Operation and Growth of the Firm ........... 13 
Table 3: Growth of Gross Value Added Post-delicensing Across Industries................... 19 
Table 4: Value Added Post-delicensing............................................................................ 22 
Table 5: Number of Factories........................................................................................... 23 
Table 6 a : Employment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 1 ............................. 25 
Table 6 b: Employment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 2.............................. 26 
Table 7 a: Investment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 1................................. 27 
Table 7 b: Investment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 2................................. 28 
Table 7 c: Robustness Tests (Dependent Variable is log value added)............................ 30 
  
 
  i 
Foreword 
 
Observers have widely acknowledged and commented upon the fact that the Indian 
growth story is mainly about services and not manufacturing. It is indeed an anomaly of 
the Indian reform process that while the reforms have been primarily focused on 
propping up the manufacturing sector, the growth has accelerated primarily in the 
services sector.  
Something seems to be holding back Indian manufacturing.  What exactly is it? This 
paper relates the pattern of growth in India's manufacturing sector to cross-industry 
heterogeneity in an industry’s dependence on infrastructure, financial sector, and in the 
use of labour relative to capital. Results in the paper show that the potential benefits from 
product market reforms might not be realized unless these are matched by enabling 
conditions, such as high quality infrastructure, availability of the right kind of labour, and 
financial markets that are deep enough. While some of the reforms are likely to be 
politically sensitive and consensus building may take time, others such as the provision of 
infrastructure—electricity, roads, ports and airports, are crucial to ensuring inclusive 
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India has undertaken extensive reforms in its manufacturing sector in the last two 
decades. However, an acceleration of growth in manufacturing, and a concomitant 
increase in employment, has eluded India. What might be holding the sector back? Using 
Annual Survey of Industries data at the three-digit level and difference in estimates this 
paper finds that the post-reform performance of the manufacturing sector is 
heterogeneous across industries. In particular, industries dependent on infrastructure or 
external finance, and labour-intensive industries have not been able to reap the maximum 
benefits of reforms. The results point to the importance of infrastructure development and 
financial sector development for the manufacturing sector’s growth to accelerate further. 
They also emphasize the need to clearly identify and address the factors inhibiting the 
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Many emerging countries in recent decades have relied on a development strategy 
focused on promoting the manufacturing sector and the export of manufactured goods. 
These include many East Asian countries and most recently, the People’s Republic of 
China. India, too, hoped for a dynamic manufacturing sector when it introduced 
substantial product market reforms in its manufacturing sector starting in the mid-1980s. 
But the sector never took off as it did in other countries. India no doubt has grown 
impressively in the last 15 years; but the main contribution to growth has come from the 
services sector rather than from the manufacturing sector. Moreover, in so far as sub-
sectors within manufacturing have performed well, these have been the relatively capital- 
or skill-intensive industries, not the labour-intensive ones as would be expected for a 
labour-abundant country like India. What could be the reasons behind the rather 
lackluster performance of the manufacturing sector in India?  
 
As Chart 1a shows, the manufacturing sector’s share in GDP has been stagnant since the 
early 1990s despite several wide ranging reforms in this sector. Similarly, Chart 1b shows 
that the contribution to GDP growth has primarily been from the services sector and this 
contribution has been increasing overtime.  
 

















Source: Authors’ calculations, Central Statistical Organization (India) 
                                                  
1 The authors are affiliated with the Delhi School of Economics; Asian Development Bank; and The 
Conference Board, NY, respectively. The views presented here are those of the authors and not 
necessarily of the institutions they are affiliated with.  
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Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain the lack of dynamism in India's 
manufacturing sector. Infrastructure-related bottlenecks are widely believed to be a part 
of the explanation. In particular, poor quality of power supply, road networks, ports and 
airports are believed to create significant disadvantages for Indian manufacturers by 
pushing up their costs of production, and making them uncompetitive in export markets.
2  
 
Besides infrastructure, some key areas of policies remain unchanged. In particular, even 
though there have been extensive product market reforms, it has been widely observed 
that the labour market reforms to complement these have not been undertaken (see 
Panagariya 2006, and Panagariya 2008; Kochhar et al 2006). Moreover, credit constraints 
due to weaknesses in the financial sector may be holding back small and medium sized 
firms from expanding (see Banerjee and Duflo 2004; Nagaraj 2005; McKinsey 2006).
3 
Finally, business regulations might have influenced key decisions of firms and potential 
investors. As the World Bank's Doing Business surveys of business regulations across the 
                                                  
2 As indicated in Gordon and Gupta (2004), the nature of production of services is probably such that it is 
less affected by infrastructure bottlenecks. 
3 Banerjee and Duflo (2004) use firm level data from the late 1990s and early 2000s and show that 
medium-sized firms -- even those well above the "small scale" threshold -- were subject to credit 
constraints and appeared to be operating well below their optimal scale.    
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world have found, the procedures and costs for starting and, especially, closing a 
manufacturing business in India are among the most cumbersome in the world.
4  
 
It would be useful to empirically test the hypotheses related to the idea that various 
elements of the policy and institutional environment facing the manufacturing sector, 
either left untouched by the liberalizations of the 1990s or dealt with only partially, have 
emerged as significant bottlenecks to growth and employment generation. 
 
One obvious way in which one can test for these hypotheses is to exploit the inter-state 
heterogeneity in the policy and institutional environment, including labour market 
regulations; financial sector development; and infrastructure for different states of India 
and then test whether the industrial performance has been better in the states with better 
policy and institutional framework. This is precisely what has been done in the existing 
literature to show the importance of labour market flexibilities in explaining the gains 
from product market liberalizations. Besley and Burgess (2004), for example, exploit 
state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) – arguably the most 
important set of labour regulations governing Indian industry - over 1958–1992, and code 
legislative changes across major states as pro-worker, neutral, or pro-employer. These 
legislative amendments are then used in the regression analyses of various outcomes in 
the manufacturing sector, including output, employment, investment and the number of 
factories. Besley and Burgess find that pro-worker labour regulations have had a negative 
impact on output, employment, and investment in organized manufacturing.
5  
 
A related paper by Aghion et al. (2006) relates various dimensions of industrial 
performance to the extent to which an industry was covered by industrial licensing 
requirements, and state-level measures of the stance of labour regulations. They find that 
the effects of industrial delicensing were unequal across Indian states. In particular, 
delicensed industries located in states with pro-employer labour regulations grew faster in 
terms of both output and employment levels than those with pro-worker regulations. 
Similarly, Mitra and Ural (2007) show that industries experiencing larger tariff reductions 
grew faster in pro-employer states relative to pro-worker states.
6 
                                                  
4 Another possibility is that hysteresis in the pattern of development in Indian manufacturing implies that 
the relative profitability of capital-and skill-intensive activities remains higher than that of labour-
intensive activities despite the reforms of the early 1990s (Kochhar et al. 2006). Other factors often 
believed to be affecting the performance of Indian manufacturing are public ownership of enterprises, 
remaining small scale industries reservations, and stringent regulations on land use in India as discussed 
in Panagariya (2008). In recent years the availability of skilled labour has also emerged as a constraint on 
the growth of manufacturing and services. 
5 While, in principle, the approach of Besley and Burgess (2003) has considerable merit, it is not without 
controversy. Bhattacharjee (2006), in particular, has argued that deciding whether an individual 
amendment to the IDA is pro-employer or pro-worker in an objective manner is quite difficult. Even if 
individual amendments can be so coded, the actual workings of the regulations can hinge on judicial 
interpretations of the amendments. Moreover, if noncompliance with the regulations is widespread, then 
even an accurate coding of amendments which takes into account the appropriate judicial interpretation 
loses its meaning.  
6 There are some differences between Mitra and Ural and Aghion et al in terms of the states deemed to have 
pro-employer or pro-worker labor regulations.  See Mitra and Ural (2007) for details.  
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In this paper we relate the pattern of growth in India's manufacturing sector to cross-
industry heterogeneity in the reliance on infrastructure and financial sectors and in the 
use of labour relative to capital. In particular, we calculate the dependence of industries 
on infrastructure, on the financial sector, and the labour intensity of industries. Using 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data at the three-digit level we employ difference in 
estimates to compare the performance of industries more dependent on infrastructure, on 
the financial sector and labour-intensive industries post-delicensing with that of the 
control group. 
 
Our results indicate that the aggregate performance of the manufacturing sector masks 
important inter-industry differences. Quite interestingly, we find that the industries with 
greater need for infrastructure; greater dependence on the financial sector; and greater 
labour intensity have performed relatively worse in the post-delicensing period. 
Quantitatively, the results indicate that in the post-delicensing period the above median, 
infrastructure-intensive industries grew 10 per cent less than the industries below the 
median of infrastructure dependence. Similarly, industries above median in the 
distribution of financial dependence grew 18 per cent less than the industries below the 
median of financial dependence; and for labour intensity, industries with above median 
labour intensity grew 19 per cent less than the below median industries post-delicensing. 
 
There are two ways in which one can interpret our results. First, one can use our results to 
identify which industries have not benefited much from reforms. Second, to the extent 
that the heterogeneity across industries on parameters such as infrastructure dependence 
is exogenous and determined by factors such as production technology, we can probably 
draw causal inferences as well. Thus, for example, we can claim that if industries 
dependent on infrastructure have not benefited as much from reforms it is because of the 
unavailability of adequate infrastructure; and similarly for industries dependent on the 
financial sector. For labour-intensive industries, an interpretation in terms of the limited 
supplies of labour would not be appropriate in the Indian context. A more natural 
interpretation would be to relate the relatively weak performance of labour-intensive 
industries to the quality of labour, skill mismatch and regulations on employment, which 
make the effective price of hiring labour too high. 
 
In order to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, the standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation; and the estimates are not biased due 
to omitted variables, we conduct extensive robustness tests, and find our results to be 
robust to these sensitivity analyses. 
 
There are two conclusions that one can draw from these results. First, product market 
reforms alone might not be sufficient to spur growth; for gains from these reforms to be 
maximized they may have to be complemented by reforms in other areas. Second, the 
potential benefits from product market reforms might not be realized unless these are 
matched by enabling conditions, such as high quality infrastructure, availability of the 
right kind of labour, and financial markets that are deep enough. There is no room for  
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complacency and efforts on a war footing should be made to remove these constraints if 
the manufacturing sector is to play the role that it did in the case of East Asian countries. 
 
One point that needs to be noted about our analysis is that it is based on data only on 
organized (or registered) manufacturing sector and not the unorganized sector. This is 
primarily because of the unavailability of detailed data for the latter. A question that 
comes up then is whether the lack of quality data on unregistered manufacturing should 
preclude any analysis of the registered manufacturing sector. Though there is no denying 
the fact that the unorganized manufacturing sector is important when it comes to 
employment, its output, wages, and productivity are very low. In terms of policy 
objectives, improving the performance of registered manufacturing is a key aspect to 
making India a powerhouse in manufacturing. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the 
Indian policy framework and lay out the stylized facts related to the performance of the 
Indian registered manufacturing sector. In Section 3, we summarize evidence from two 
different firm-level survey data, whereas Section 4 specifies the main econometric 
exercise, and presents and discusses our results. The last section concludes. 
 
Section II:  Stylized Facts and Preliminary Evidence 
 
II A:  Indian Policy Framework 
 
Since the early 1950s up until the early 1980s the evolution of India's manufacturing 
sector was guided by industrial and trade policies that protected domestic industry and 
gave the state a central role in investment decisions. While a strict regime of import and 
export controls defined trade policy, industrial policy worked through an elabourate 
system of industrial licensing.  Under the Industries Development and Regulatory Act of 
1951, every investor over a very small size needed to obtain a licence before establishing 
an industrial plant, adding a new product line to an existing plant, substantially expanding 
output, or changing a plant’s location. 
 
While the state-led import substitution policy framework had helped create a diversified 
manufacturing sector, industrial stagnation since the mid-1960s — increasingly blamed 
on the policy framework — led to some tentative steps aimed at liberalizing these 
regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Ahluwalia 1987, 1991). Relaxations of the 
industrial licensing system were introduced and import licensing requirements were 
eased. However, by most accounts these reforms were marginal. Tariff rates as high as 
400 per cent were not uncommon, non-tariff barriers remained widespread, and the 
industrial licensing regime continued to impose binding constraints to entry and growth 
for most firms. The so-called small-scale sector reservations (introduced in 1969), which 
limited the entry and operations of firms above a certain size threshold in a number of 
labour-intensive industries, continued in full force. (This was largely the case until 2000, 
and recent reforms have left only 35 items on the list). 
  
 























































































































More serious liberalization efforts began in 1985 with delicensing—the exemption from 
the requirement of obtaining an industrial license—of 25 broad categories of industries, 
which maps into 13 industries in our three-digit level data. The next major reform of the 
licensing regime came in 1991 when industrial licensing was abolished except in the case 
of a small number of industries (see Chart 2a and Table A4 for the time path of 
delicensing). This was also the year in which a decisive break was made with the trade 
policies of the past. The liberalization of 1991 included the removal of most licensing and 
other non-tariff barriers on the imports of intermediate and capital goods, the 
simplification of the trade regime, devaluations of the Indian rupee and the introduction 
of an explicit dual exchange market in 1992 (see Chart 2b).  
 


















Source: Based on Aghion et al (2006) and extended by the Authors 
 

















Source: Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2007)  
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Despite these impressive reform measures there are certain areas in which there has been 
little progress. One area in which there has been no major policy change is in the labour 
regulations that apply to India's industry sector. According to Panagariya (2008), it is 
rigidities introduced by these (unchanged) regulations that are holding back the 
manufacturing sector in general and its labour-intensive sub-sectors in particular. Since 
the issue of India's labour regulations is one of the most contentious ones in the context 
of debates on economic reforms, some details are in order. 
 
While India's labour regulations have been criticized on many accounts including, for 
example, the sheer size and scope of regulations, their complexity, and inconsistencies 
across individual pieces of regulation, a few specific pieces of legislation are the 
controversial ones. First, as per Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) it is 
necessary for firms employing more than 100 workers to obtain the permission of state 
governments in order to retrench or lay off workers.
7 While the IDA does not prohibit 
retrenchments, critics of the act argue that it is difficult to carry them out. Datta-
Chaudhuri (1996) has argued, for example, that states have often been unwilling to grant 
permission to retrench. 
 
Second, additional rigidities in using effectively a firm’s existing workers are believed to 
stem from Section 9A of the IDA and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 
which pertain to procedures that must be followed by employers before changing the 
terms and conditions of work. While the two pieces of legislation seek to make labour 
contracts complete, fair, and legally binding they can constrain firms from making quick 
adjustments to changing conditions. In particular, worker consent is required in order to 
modify job descriptions or move workers from one plant to another in response to 
changing market conditions. In and of itself, this does not seem to be an unreasonable 
objective. The problem, according to some analysts, is that the workings of India’s Trade 
Union Act (TUA) make it difficult to obtain worker consent. While the TUA allows any 
seven workers in an enterprise to form and register a trade union, it has no provisions for 
union recognition (for example, via a secret ballot).  The result, according to Anant 
(2000), has been multiple and rival unions, making it difficult to arrive at a consensus 
among workers. 
 
Similarly, hiring contract workers can enable firms to get around many of the regulatory 
restrictions on adjusting employment levels, productions tasks, etc.; however, it is argued 
that Section 10 of the Contract Labour Act, which empowers the Government to prohibit 
the employment of contract labour in any industry, operation, or process, limits this 
course of action. 
 
                                                  
7 Until 1976, the provisions of the IDA on retrenchments or layoffs were fairly uncontroversial.  The IDA 
allowed firms to layoff or retrench workers as per economic circumstances as long as certain requirements 
such as the provision of sufficient notice, severance payments, and the order of retrenchment among 
workers (last in first out) were met. An amendment in 1976 (the introduction of Chapter VB), however, 
made it compulsory for employers with more than 300 workers to seek the prior approval of the 
appropriate government before workers could be dismissed. A further amendment in 1982 widened the 
scope of this regulation by making it applicable to employers with 100 workers or more.   
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It is important to note that not all analysts agree that India’s labour laws have made for a 
rigid labour market.  In particular, a counter-argument to the views above is that the 
rigidity inducing regulations have been either ignored (see Nagaraj (2002)) or 
circumvented through the increased usage of temporary or contract labour (see Datta 
(2003) and Ramaswamy (2003)).
8  Ultimately, whether India’s labour laws have created 
significant rigidities in labour markets or not is an empirical issue, as is the broader 
question of whether and to what extent various policies have been the main constraints on 
the growth of Indian manufacturing. 
 
Another well-known constraint on growth is India’s crumbling infrastructure. According 
to the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, 
India needs to increase its investment in infrastructure from 5 per cent of GDP to 8 per 
cent of the GDP by the end of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, yielding an investment of 
USD 400 billion in its infrastructure to sustain the current growth rates.  One does not 
need any scientific evidence to show that infrastructure in India needs to be improved, as 
the erratic and costly electricity supply, congested roads, ports and airports are for all to 
witness. A recent OECD survey of Indian economy report compares Indian infrastructure 
with that of other countries and finds India to be badly lagging in most of the areas. 
 
An interesting comparison in this regard is with the infrastructure in China. Total 
investment anticipated in infrastructure in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-2006) in India 
 





















Source: Authors’ calculation, Planning Commission (2007) (Sector-wise Investment  
Anticipated in the Tenth Five Year Plan), Lall et al (2007). 
                                                  
8 For a detailed review of Indian labor regulations and the debate surrounding the issue of rigidity, see 
Anant et al (2006).  
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was one 5 per cent as compared to China’s 12.6 per cent in 2005 (Chart 3). Not only is 
China’s investment as a share of GDP almost 2.5 per cent times greater than that of India, 
China’s GDP base is larger as well. In almost all sectors, investment as a share of GDP in 
China is far greater than those in India (Chart 3). 
 
Another area in which there has been rather slow progress on reforms is the financial 
sector (or the banking sector, more narrowly). Reform efforts in this area have been 
directed at deregulating interest rates; some dilution of public ownership of banks; and 
limited opening up of the sector to private domestic and foreign banks. However, as 
pointed out often, and most recently in the OECD Economic Survey on India (2007), 
some major challenges still remain. These include a very high share of public ownership 
in banks and low level of bank intermediation partly because of regulations on the 
allocation of credit, which require banks to allocate a substantial percentage of their total 
advances into government securities and other priority sectors.
9 
 
II B: Performance of Indian Manufacturing 
 
We look at a fairly long time series of data on Indian registered manufacturing from 
1973-2003.
10 Below, we summarize some of the empirical regularities that we observe in 
the data on the various indicators of industrial performance and on employment-related 
variables.
11 Various panels of Chart 4 show that the growth of value added, employment, 
capital formation and factories has been stable throughout the last three decades and has 
not necessarily accelerated in the post-reform period. If anything, there is probably a 
stagnation starting sometime in the mid to late 1990s. 
 
Panel B of the chart shows separately the employment of blue-collar workers and total 
employment. The trends seem to be broadly similar for both the variables. The data on 
contractual labour, is available only since 1998, but the trends show an increase in the 
share of contractual labour in total employment. The pace of growth of capital stock 
seems to be faster than that of employment. These different trends in employment and 
investment are probably reflected in the growth of labour productivity over time. Finally, 
the number of factories does not seem to have kept pace with the growth of value added. 
                                                  
9 In addition since the performance of the bank managers is not linked as tightly with the profitability of the 
banks, and is probably influenced more by the incidence of non-performing loans, they have little 
incentives to provide credit to the private sector. Hence they play extremely cautious and rather than 
lending to the private sector would rather invest in safe government securities (see Banerjee and Duflo, 
2004). 
10 Reference period for ASI is the accounting year of the industrial unit ending on any day during the fiscal 
year.  Therefore, in ASI 2003-04, the data collected from the respective industrial units relates to their 
accounting year ending on any day between 1st April, 2003, and 31 March, 2004. When we say 2003 in 
the paper it refers to the fiscal year 2003-04. 
11 The only comprehensive database available on Indian manufacturing is the ASI data which includes data 
on registered manufacturing, i.e. factories with more than 20 workers if not using power and factories 
employing more than 10 workers if using power. One caveat of using this data is that we are only looking 
at a fraction of total manufacturing. Registered manufacturing comprises 70 per cent of the total output 









The trends in these charts are also picked up in the table below. In Table 1, we estimate 
the trend growth rates for the aggregate values of various performance indicators 
pertaining to the manufacturing sector. The regression equations include the dependent 
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the post-1992 period, and zero otherwise. Thus, its coefficient measures the percentage 
change in the dependent variable post-1992 after accounting for its trend growth rate. 
 
The results indicate a marginal pickup in the growth rate of value added post-1992; and 
in the rate of investment, but no significant improvement in the number of factories 
operating or in employment.
12 
 
Table 1: Pre- and Post-reform Performance of Indian Manufacturing 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Trend  5.997*** 7.318*** 2.703***  1.292*** 
  [21.82] [27.16]  [7.75]  [5.26] 
Trend*Post1992   0.447** 0.838***  -0.375*  -0.013 
  [2.18] [4.55] [2.04]  [0.08] 
Observations 31  31  31  31 
R-squared 0.98  0.99  0.87  0.77 
 
Note: 3 digit ASI data from 1973-2003 has been used in the analysis. All variables are measured 
in log. Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%; ** significance at 
5%; *** significance at 1%. 
 
Thus, the data show that the aggregate value added has increased at about 6 per cent a 
year in the sample period, and there has been a modest annual growth acceleration of 
about ½ percentage point between 1993 and 2003. This modest pickup in value added is 
not accompanied by an additional growth in employment or in the number of factories. 
Employment has grown at the rate of 1.3 per cent a year, with no change in the rate of 
growth post-delicensing. New factories have come up at the rate of 2.7 per cent a year; 
with the rate decelerating post-1992. Investment rate, however, has been commensurate 
with the growth of value added. Investment accelerated by about 8.5 per cent post-1992. 
Poor performance of employment is a very important question in itself and we cannot do 
full justice to this issue here, hence propose to take it up in another paper. 
 
Is this growth pickup impressive and does it imply that the reforms have paid off? When 
we compare this performance with the pace of growth in the manufacturing sector of 
many East Asian countries, including China, we realise that not only in terms of 
employment, but also in terms of value added, the performance of Indian manufacturing 
                                                  
12 The ASI data is available till FY 2003-2004; hence we do not include data for 2004-2006 in the analysis 
when there has been growth acceleration in the industrial sector.  
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has not been close to that of East Asian countries. For example, manufacturing value 
added in South Korea grew at an average annual real growth rate of approximately 17 per 
cent between 1960 and 1980; China’s manufacturing sector witnessed an average growth 
rate of 12 per cent per year between 1990 and 2005.  
 
Section III:  Evidence from Enterprise Surveys  
 
What lies behind this relatively lacklustre performance?  Before turning to the main 
econometric analysis of this paper, it is useful to examine the views of managers based on 
two recent surveys of manufacturing firms: the Investment Climate Survey conducted by 
the World Bank and a survey of about 250 firms from some of the most labour intensive 
sectors, conducted by ICRIER (Field Survey on “How to Enhance Employment 
Generation and Exports of Labour Intensive Firms”).
13 
 
The World Bank's investment climate survey (ICS) data consists of the responses of 
managers to a wide range of questions including those pertaining to managers’ 
perceptions about how various regulatory and other factors influence their firms.  A key 
question asks about the extent to which various factors are considered "a problem for the 
operation and growth" of the surveyed firm's business. For each factor listed, respondents 
can reply in terms of a five-point scale: 0= no obstacle; 1= minor obstacle; 2= moderate 
obstacle; 3= major obstacle; 4= very severe obstacle.
14 It enables one to compare firms' 
responses about various factors, ranging from regulatory and governance issues to 
infrastructure-related concerns, in terms of how they influence firms’ operations or 
growth prospects. 
 
Chart 5 depicts the fraction of firms describing a given factor as a major or very severe 
obstacle in the 2005 ICS survey (similar patterns are observed in the 2002 ICS survey). 
Tax-related issues, incorporating difficulties with either the tax administration system or 
complaints about tax rates, are considered to be a major or severe constraint by more than 
40 per cent of respondents.  Of course, it is not easy to interpret this finding given what is 
probably a natural penchant among firms to want to pay as little as possible in taxes.  
Ignoring tax-related issues then, the situation with infrastructure can be seen to be a 
critical obstacle for operations and growth from the perspective of the firms.
15  Almost 40 
per cent of respondents cite it as a major or severe obstacle. In addition to infrastructure, 
one fifth or more respondents cite governance issues (which include concerns with 
corruption) and the cost and access to finance as the major obstacles. Surprisingly, an 
almost equal per cent of respondents cite skills and labour regulations as major obstacles 
(around 15 per cent). 
                                                  
13 This survey was conducted by a team led by Dr. Deb Kusum Das. We thank him for sharing the data 
with us. 
14 We are aware that the phrasing of this question may not be ideal since it lumps together operations and 
growth.  It is quite possible, for example, that some aspect of industrial regulations may not be a problem 
for the operations of a firm, unless the firm tried to expand its operations. 
15  Infrastructure includes electricity, telecommunications, and transportation.  Disaggregating this variable 
shows that the concern with infrastructure is overwhelmingly driven by concerns with electricity. 
Telecommunications are hardly considered a problem.  
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Source: Authors' estimates based on World Bank-CII survey data
All firms, 2005
Fraction reporting issue as 'major' or 'very severe' obstacle





















A useful follow-up question entailed asking firms what constituted the single most 
important obstacle for firms’ operation and growth.  By far the biggest problem relates to 
infrastructure and within this, electricity was cited as the key issue. Indeed, 31 per cent of 
firms listed electricity as the source of their single most important obstacle to operations 
and growth. 
 




Number of responses  Percent of responses 
Infrastructure 821  36 
Tax issues  510  22 
Governance 231 10 
Finance 130  6 
Skills 91  4 




Another source of the views of manufacturing firm managers comes from the ICRIER 
survey of 250 enterprises engaged in manufacturing activities in five different sectors 
(apparel, bicycles, gems and jewelry, leather, and sports goods).  It is useful to examine 
the results of this survey because it covers firms from some of the most labour-intensive 
manufacturing activities. Thus, to the extent that labour regulations create serious 




Broadly speaking, the respondents find electricity and infrastructure in general; 
financing; and skilled labour availability to be the most serious constraints on growth. 
Just like in the ICS survey they also point to specific regulations, especially those related 
to taxes (and fiscal benefits, in general), among things that can be improved.
17 The chart 
below summarizes the responses of the firms.
18 
 
In response to the questions on hurdles to increasing employment, a majority of the 
respondents reported shortage of labour (of mostly skilled and semi-skilled labour) as the 
key hurdle to hiring more labour.
19 Further, most of the firms (approximately 90 per cent) 
responded in the negative to being affected by any labour disputes or to having labour 
unions in their organization and/or any impact of the unions on their activities. 
 
                                                  
16 Not all the firms covered responded to all the questions in the survey. For the purposes of the present 
study, we focus on the responses relating to the questions on the hurdles to the growth of the firms. 
17 A look at the specific responses makes it clear that the concern with fiscal issues is very narrowly defined 
and is more in the nature of a personal issue to the firms, to the extent that taxes directly affect their 
bottom lines. In response to the question what would you like to see changed to help you, majority of 
them answered that they would like the taxes to be lowered or subsidies from the government. 
18 The survey also tried to find whether the technological changes are such that they are inhibiting 
employment growth. About two-third of the respondents acknowledged technological changes (either a 
lot or modest) taking place globally in their industry. Of those answering in affirmative to world-wide 
changes in technology in their respective industries, 70 percent of the respondents adopted new 
technology during the five years prior to the year of the survey; but the majority of them still find a gap 
between the technologies they used and those used globally. In general, however, there is no clear 
evidence on the impact of adoption of new technologies on labor. One potential explanation for the lack 
of a clear pattern could be that while adoption of new technology, on one hand, might be labor saving 
(substitution effect) and, on the other hand, growth result from adopting new technology might be 
expansionary and lead to hiring of more labor (growth effect). 
19 Interestingly approximately 10 percent of the firms rue the lack of training facilities. This is consistent 

































Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the ICRIER survey 
 
Taken together, there are some striking similarities in the results of these two very 
different surveys.  First, infrastructure-related issues are very high on the list of 
constraints faced by firms.  Indeed, ignoring tax-related issues, concerns with electricity 
seem to be paramount.  Second, finance-related issues also seem be a problem, especially 
for the smaller firms.  Third, surprisingly labour regulations do not show up as a 
significant concern for firms.  Indeed, both surveys suggest that concerns with skills-
related issues are more important than those having to do with labour regulations. 
 
While the concerns with electricity are not surprising for anyone with some familiarity 
with the Indian industrial scene, the low ranking of labour regulations as obstacles for 
operations and growth is surprising. One interpretation of these results could be that 
labour regulations may not matter much to firms in practice. This could happen, for 
example, if noncompliance with labour regulations is not costly.  Alternatively, firms 
may be able to “get around” restrictions on layoffs by hiring contract workers.  A second 
interpretation of these results, however, is that labour regulations may not matter that 
much to incumbent firms. But it may matter to a non-incumbent investor contemplating 
entry into the manufacturing sector. 
 
More generally, an investor’s choice on which specific sectors (for example, services 
versus manufacturing) and subsectors (for example, a more labour intensive 
manufacturing industry versus a less labour-intensive one) to enter, as well as the 
production technologies, scale, and desired levels of employment to adopt, can be 
expected to be influenced by the regulatory framework.  In this way, there may be an “ex-
ante” effect of the law that would be very difficult to capture through the surveys of  
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incumbent manufactures.  In other words, deterred by specific elements of labour 
regulations such as Chapter VB of the IDA, potential investors, especially those 
contemplating large investments, choose to avoid investing in manufacturing altogether, 
or if they do invest in manufacturing, they avoid subsectors, product lines, or scales of 
production for which the regulations have most bite. 
 
In what follows, we turn to an approach which has the potential for getting around the 
“selection” problem inherent in surveys of incumbent firms. In particular, we use 
industry-level data from India's organized manufacturing sector to examine the relative 
performance of industries with various characteristics. 
 
Section IV:  Econometric Analysis 
 
We are interested in testing the variants of the following hypotheses: did industries that 
are more labour intensive; or industries that rely more on infrastructure; or industries that 
rely more on the financial sector for their financing needs grew less than the control 
group of industries in post-delicensing period? The econometric methodology is derived 
from Rajan and Zingales (1998), who analyse the effect of financial development on 
growth by comparing the growth of industries, which depend more on the financial sector 
in countries with greater financial depth with the growth of these industries in countries 
with shallower financial markets. Thus, if the financial sector indeed matters for growth 
then one would see higher growth in industries that rely on the financial sector in 
countries which have deeper financial sector, and vice versa. This technique gets to the 
causality issue much more cleverly than the alternative econometric ways to measure this 
relationship. The methodology has subsequently been used in several different contexts.
20 
 
We use this technique to look at the constraints that Indian industry might have 
experienced post-delicensing. Hence we analyse the performance of the industries that 
rely more heavily on infrastructure; industries that depend on the financial sector; and the 
labour-intensive industries post-delicensing. An evidence of lacklustre growth in these 
industries is attributed then to the unavailability of inputs or factors that the respective 
industries rely more heavily on. Thus, if the infrastructure-dependent industries have not 
performed well post-delicensing then it is likely to be due to the fact that the 
infrastructure availability has not been adequate for these industries to avail of the 
maximum benefit from the reforms. 
  
IV A: Construction of Variables 
 
Reform Variables: As discussed in Section II, industrial and trade policy has seen wide 
ranging reforms over the period under study. While limited reforms were started from 
mid-1980s onwards, major policy changes were undertaken following the crisis in 1991. 
Some of the reforms introduced were more generic aimed at macroeconomic 
management; others were more specific to the industries. The reforms spanned several 
areas, including delicensing of industries; trade reforms and exchange rates reforms. In 
                                                  
20 See e.g. Dell’Ariccia et al(2005); Rajan and Subramanian (2005);    
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subsequent years these were complemented by the liberalisation of foreign investment—
both FDI and portfolio; dereservation of industrial sectors under small scale; financial 
sector liberalisation; and privatisation of public sector units. 
 
In our econometric exercise we look at the effect of delicensing on Indian manufacturing 
industries. The reasons being that it is one of the most comprehensive programmes which 
covered almost all the industries, and the information on it is readily available. The fact 
that these reforms were undertaken at different points in time, allows us to include time-
fixed effects to account for unobservable but common macroeconomic shocks in the 
regressions. We do not have complete data for trade reforms, but we do control for it in 
the robustness exercises.
21 In robustness tests we also estimate a specification in which 
we include the interaction of industry characteristics with a post-1992 dummy in the 
benchmark specification to account for the reforms, which were more generic in nature, 
besides the delicensing. Results remain broadly unchanged and are presented selectively 
here. 
 
Industrial Characteristics: Next, we define three industrial characteristics of various 
industries: labour intensity; dependence of industries on external finance; and 
infrastructure dependence.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) assume that there are probably 
technological reasons why some industries depend more on external finance than others. 
We extend this reasoning to labour intensity and infrastructure intensity. To the extent 
that these two characteristics define input usage, the technological requirement 
assumption is perhaps as valid as for defining the external financing dependence. We 
briefly describe the various industrial characteristics below, further details are provided in 
the various tables in the Appendices. 
 
Labour Intensity: We define labour intensity as the ratio of total employment to capital 
stock. Since there are no comprehensive databases of employment at firm level we use 
the ASI industry level data to calculate this ratio. 
 
Dependence on External Finance: We calculate the external financial dependence of 
firms in two different ways and using two different databases. The first one uses the firm-
level data from the Prowess database published by the CMIE, and employs the same 
definition as used by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The second measure is calculated using 
the ASI data as the ratio of outstanding loans to invested capital. The index of external 
finance dependence does not correlate well across two databases and across different 
definitions. Neither of these correlates too well with the index calculated by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) that was calculated for industrial data at two-digit level for US industries. 
To the extent that our firm-level data (from Prowess) is only for listed firms whose access 
to financial markets is likely to be different from that of small and medium enterprises, 
and it might affect the cross-industry ranking, we use the financial dependence indicator 
calculated using the ASI data. 
 
                                                  
21 See Mitra and Ural (2007); Kumar and Mishra (2008) and Topalova (2005) for the analyses of the effects 
of trade liberalization.  
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Infrastructure Dependence of Industries: We calculate it as the ratio of expenses on 
distribution (i.e., storage and transportation) and power and fuel to gross value added 
using the firm level data. To the extent that we have data on expenses on fuel 
consumption in both the CMIE and ASI, we calculate an indicator just as the ratio of fuel 
expenditure to gross value added. These are highly correlated across the two databases; 
and with the indicator, which includes distribution expenses as well. Appendix B1 
indicates which industries quality as below or above median for each of these 
characteristics. 
 
In order to get around the concern that these characteristics would reflect the equilibrium 
conditions between the demand and supply of the respective inputs, we use the data from 
an earlier year (in general we use averages over the early1990s, but where data are 
available we confirmed that the industry characteristics are correlated highly with the 
ones that calculate using the data for earlier period) rather than contemporaneous data. 
Furthermore, to smooth out the noise in the data we use five-year averages of the relevant 
variables to calculate the industry indicators. We also confirmed, where possible, that the 
relative industry rankings across various characteristics do not change overtime. This 
robustness check gives credence to the belief that there are perhaps external technological 
reasons for why an industry uses more external finance; or uses more labour than capital; 
or depends more on infrastructure; and to the fact that using data from the early1990s is 
legitimate. 
 
The questions that come to mind about these industry features are: are these capturing 
some other features of the industries; and how are the three features correlated with each 
other. In Tables B2 in the Appendix, we report correlations among these characteristics 
and some of the other features of the industries that we could calculate. As we can see 
from the table the various industry characteristics are not correlated significantly with 
each other. The exceptions include that the labour-intensive industries are negatively 
correlated with imports and financial dependence; and infrastructure dependence is 
negatively correlated with import and FDI intensity. Labour-intensive industries are also 
somewhat more export-intensive. 
 
IVB: Empirical Results from the ASI Data 
 
We begin by exploring the possibility that the overall performance of the manufacturing 
sector masks significant inter-industry heterogeneity. Are there certain industries which 
have not benefited as much from the reforms? 
 
In Table 3 below, we find that the performance varies across different sectors. In 
particular, we identify industries, which depend more on infrastructure and the financial 
sector for their financing needs and the labour-intensive industries (see Appendix B1). 
We divide the industries into those belonging to above or median values for each industry 
characteristic and estimate separate regressions for industries below and above median 
values. We use log of value added as the dependent variable and control for industry and  
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year fixed effects and a dummy for delicensing which varies across industries and years 
in the regressions. 
 





















Delicensing   -0.15*** 0.33*** 0.08 0.18*** -0.01  0.24***
 [3.12] [4.46] [1.31] [2.64] [0.22]  [3.19]
Observations 682 679 682 679 682  679
Number of Industries  22 22 22 22 22  22
Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
R-squared 0.77 0.66 0.71 0.70 0.69  0.72
 
Note:  
We have used 3 digit ASI data from 1973-2003 in the analysis. The industry characteristics 
have been defined as explained in Section III and Appendix 2. The dependent variable used 
is value added in log. Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * indicates significance at 
10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. 
 
Results in Table 3 show that the industries which are more infrastructure-intensive, on 
average, experience 15 per cent lower growth in value added post-delicensing (i.e., in the 
delicensed period relative to the earlier period), as compared with 33 per cent higher 
output growth in value added of industries which are less reliant on infrastructure. 
Similarly, the industries more dependent on the financial sector or the labour-intensive 
industries have fared much worse than the industries that do not rely as much on the 
financial sector and are less labour-intensive.  Thus, there seems to be significant 




IV C: Econometric Framework 
 
We use the following econometric specification to analyse the impact of delicensing on 
various performance indicators: 
Yit = Σαi di + Σβt dt+ γ (delicensing dummyit ) + 
δ (characteristic of industry i * delicensing dummyit) + εit                                 (1) 
 
Where Yit is the outcome variable measured in log. As before we consider gross value 
added at constant prices, employment, capital stock, and number of factories as the 
outcome variables. 
 
In equation 1, di’s are industry-specific dummies and αi’s are their respective 
coefficients; dt’s are year-specific dummies and βt’s are their respective coefficients. The 
fixed effects account for the industry-specific omitted variables; and the year fixed effects 
control for year-specific shocks that are common to all industries.  Since we are using 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in the regression equation the only additional 
variables we can include are the ones that vary with both industry and year. The next 
term in equation 1 is the delicensing dummy, which varies over time and industry. The 
dummy takes a value one from the year when the delicensing requirement for a particular 
industry was removed and remains one for the rest of the sample period.
22 
 
We are interested in testing the variants of the following hypotheses: did industries that 
are more labour intensive (or industries that rely more on infrastructure or the financial 
sector for their financing needs) grow less than the control group of industries in the post-
delicensing period? Testing for these hypotheses requires us to set up the regression 
equation for difference in differences estimates.  Continuing with the specific hypothesis 
involving labour-intensive industries, consider the following possible cases for any given 
outcome variable: 
 
 Outcome  Variable  in 
Pre Reform period 
Outcome variable in 
Post-reform period 
For More Labour Intensive 
(treatment group)  ΘL,Pre  ΘL,Post 
For Less Labour  Intensive 
(control group)  ΘC,Pre  ΘC,Post 
 
Essentially, we would like to test the hypothesis that (ΘL,Post- ΘL,Pre)-( ΘC,Post- ΘC,Pre) is 
significantly different from zero. The coefficient δ in equation 1 allows us to do this. We 
use the interaction with each of the industry characteristics discussed above with 
delicensing separately and together in the regression equations. 
                                                  
22 The delicensing dummy is based on the information provided in Aghion et al (2006) which we updated 




How do we interpret a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term of a 
particular industry characteristic, let’s say infrastructure-dependent industries? The 
coefficient indicates that the industries which use infrastructure more intensively have 
grown less post-delicensing as compared to the industries which use infrastructure less 
intensively. Can it be interpreted as a causal relationship between the lack of 
infrastructure and performance? As mentioned in the introduction, to the extent that an 
industry characteristic is exogenous of performance, e.g., it is some sort of a technical 
requirement; or if we can have control for potential omitted variables, then we can 
probably claim causality in this result. 
 
For exogeneity in our industry characteristics we use the data from the earliest possible 
period for which we have the data (in our case the early1990s). We control for omitted 
variables varying only over industries and over years by including the respective fixed 
effects. To rule out other potential omitted variables, we conduct extensive robustness 
tests as described later. 
 
In Table 4, we present our results for the benchmark case as given by Equation 1. 
Coefficients on both the industry and year fixed effects have been suppressed from the 
table. In the results in column 1, the coefficient for delicensing shows a 12 per cent 
increase in value added per industry post-delicensing. Given that the average delicensing 
period is about 15 years, it amounts to a less than 1 per cent increase in value added per 
year in post-delicensing period. However, as we had seen in Table 3, certain industries 
did not fare as well during the post-delicensing period. Thus, when we control for the 
different effects on these industries separately, the post-delicensing impact on growth of 
the control group improves substantially. 
 
In Columns 2-4, we include these characteristics with the interaction of delicensing one at 
a time. As expected, the performance of the control group goes up considerably. From 
Columns 2-4, we see that the industries more dependent on infrastructure, labour and 
external finance respectively have witnessed slower growth as opposed to their respective 
control group. In Column 5, we include them together and find that industries ranking 
higher on each of our three industry characteristics have fared poorly in the post-
delicensing period. Finally, the last column is the same as Column 5 except that in this 
column instead of including the index of industry characteristics, we divide them into 
above and below median groups and include the interaction of the dummy variables that 
takes the value when an industry is above the median of the respective characteristic, 
with delicensing. Once again we find that (the results hold and)? industries above the 
median in each of the three characteristics have not done as well as the control group in 




Table 4: Value Added Post-delicensing 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Delicensing 0.12** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.53*** 0.93***  0.36***





 [2.42] [2.59] 
Labour Intensity*Delicensing  -0.30** -
0.51*** 



















   [3.40]
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361  1361
Number of Industries  44 44 44 44 44  44
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71  0.71
 
 
Dependent variable is log value added. Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Quantitatively, the results, from Column 6 of Table 4, indicate that in the post-
delicensing period the above median infrastructure intensive industries grew 10 per cent 
less than the industries below the median of infrastructure dependence. Similarly, 
industries above median in the distribution of financial dependence grew 18 per cent less 
than the industries below the median of financial dependence; and for labour intensity, 
industries with above median labour intensity grew 19 per cent less than the below 
median industries post-delicensing. 
 
In Table 5, results are presented for dependent variable, number of factories (in log). The 
overall performance of Indian manufacturing seems to be even less impressive when we 
look at the number of factories. Overall there is no acceleration in the rate of expansion 
of factories post-delicensing. These results are on account of the fact that the performance 
has been particularly worse for the labour-intensive industries and industries dependent  
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on the financial sector. Once we control these as in the previous set of regressions, the 
performance of the control group (industries less dependent on infrastructure or financial 
sector or labour) is seen to be much better. The point remains that industries more 
dependent on external finance and labour intensive industries have fared much worse in 
the post-delicensing period in terms of new factories opening. 
 
Table 5: Number of Factories 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Delicensing 0.04 0.03 0.11** 0.15**  0.31***
 [1.09] [0.86] [2.20] [2.41]  [3.42]
Infrastructure Dep* Delicensing  0.02   0.01
 [0.39]   [0.23]
Labour Intensity*Delicensing  -0.16**   -0.22***
 [2.15]   [2.86]
External Finance Dep*Delicensing  -0.27**  -0.39***
 [2.24]  [3.05]
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 1361 1361 1361 1361  1361
Number of Industries  44 44 44 44  44
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58  0.58
 
 
Dependent variable is log number of factories. Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Next, we look at employment and capital stock. The issues related to employment are 
manifold and much more complex, and all of these probably cannot be addressed in this 
paper. Some of the issues that merit attention include: why has growth not been 
employment-intensive; is technology displacing labour; how has the employment of 
unskilled vs. skilled workers evolved overtime; how is the skill premium changing 
overtime etc. For brevity, we look only at total employment here, which includes manual 
workers as well as supervisors; and regular as well as contract employees. 
 
We look at two econometric specifications here. The first is the estimates from equation 
1, results of which are reported in Table 6a and 7a, respectively, for employment and 
capital stock. From Column 1 of Table 6a, employment has increased by a mere 7 per  
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cent over the entire delicensing period. With the average delicensing period about 15 
years, this translates into a less than ½ per cent increase in employment per year post-
product market reforms. 
 
As expected, once we introduce heterogeneity based on industry characteristics, the 
performance of the control group improves rather substantially (Columns 2-5). The 
maximum increase is in the case of the industries less dependent on external finance. 
Notably, infrastructure and external finance dependent industries as well as labour-
intensive industries are the weakest performers in so far as employment generation in the 
post-delicensing period is concerned.  
 
In addition, we estimate the following regression equation:  
Eit =  Σαi di + Σβt dt+ θYit + πYit  x delicensing dummyit 
λ (Yit x *characteristic of industry i * delicensing dummyit) + εit                   (2) 
 
In equation 2, Eit refers to log of employment (or log of invested capital in real terms), 
di’s are industry-specific dummies and dt’s are year-specific dummies as before. We also 
include the log of gross value added in the equation; the coefficient θ can be interpreted 
as the employment elasticity of output. It measures the percentage change in employment 
for a 1 per cent increase in output. The next term is the interaction of delicensing dummy 
with Yit.  Its coefficient π gives the employment elasticity of output post-delicensing. 
Finally, we include the interaction of Yit, delicensing and industry characteristics. The 
coefficient λ measures the employment elasticity of output for the industry characteristic 
used in the interaction with post-delicensing. Thus, if we are including labour intensity in 
the interaction term in equation 2 then it measures the change in the elasticity of 
employment post-delicensing in labour-intensive industries. If it is positive it implies that 
the employment elasticity in labour-intensive industries has increased post-delicensing 
and so on. 
 
Results on employment from specification 2 are in Table 6b. The results indicate that the 
employment elasticity of output is about 50 per cent on average, though there are 
differences across industries. The elasticity is higher for labour-intensive industries than 
for those dependent on infrastructure or finance. Results also indicate that there has been 
no change in the elasticity of employment post-delicensing, this is true on average for all 
industries, including the industry characteristics that we control for explicitly in our 
regressions.  
 
These results have two implications: first, if growth were to accelerate in Indian 
manufacturing it would probably generate employment at the same rate as before; and 
second, in order to generate more employment in Indian manufacturing it is imperative 
that the labour-intensive sectors grow faster. As we mentioned earlier, aggregate 
employment masks several nuances related to different kinds of employment, but we do 




Table 6 a : Employment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 1 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Delicensing 0.07**  0.15***  0.11*  0.36***  0.59*** 
 [2.47]  [4.37]  [1.92]  [3.95]  [7.03] 
Infrastructure Dep* Delicensing    -0.25***      -0.25*** 
   [5.69]      [6.12] 
Labour Intensity*Delicensing      -0.075    -0.22** 
     [0.64]    [2.05] 
External Finance Dep*Delicensing        -0.67***  -0.78*** 
       [3.48]  [4.62] 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1361  1361  1361  1361  1361 
Number of Industries  44  44  44  44  44 
R-squared 0.35  0.36  0.35  0.36  0.37 
 




Table 6 b: Employment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 2 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Log Gross value added (GVA)  0.52***  0.57***  0.47***  0.62***  0.55*** 
 [20.76]  [19.49]  [17.30] [9.14]  [7.03] 
Delicensing*GVA -0.000  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.004 
 [0.27]  [0.35]  [0.48]  [0.28]  [0.86] 
Infrastructure*GVA   -0.20***      -0.16*** 
   [3.98]      [3.19] 
Infrastructure*Delicensing*GVA   0.003      0.001 
   [0.90]      [0.28] 
Labour Intensity*GVA      0.09***    0.08*** 
     [3.36]    [2.70] 
Labour Intensity*Delicensing*GVA      -0.000    -0.002 
     [0.13]    [0.66] 
Financial dep*GVA        -0.26*  -0.107 
       [1.92]  [0.74] 
Financial dep*Delicesning*GVA        -0.001  -0.004 
       [0.10]  [0.43] 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1361  1361  1361  1361  1361 
Number of Industries  44  44  44  44  44 
R-squared 0.69  0.70  0.70  0.70  0.70 
 
Dependent variable is log Employment. Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. GVA 




For analysing the patterns in investment we use both the specifications used for 
employment (Tables 7a and 7b). Thus, we look at the capital elasticity (i.e., how 
investment changes) of value added and compare it with the behaviour of investment 
post-delicensing. We also compare the investment behaviour across industries and see 
whether there are any patterns in the investment changes across industries post-
delicensing. Here we find that the capital elasticity (Table 7b) is higher than employment 
elasticity. Across industries, infrastructure- and financially-dependent industries see 
higher investment than the labour-intensive ones as value added increases. Investment 
has also increased somewhat post-delicensing; quite interestingly this is on account of a 
higher investment in the labour-intensive industries. Thus, over time and especially post-
delicensing, the labour-intensive industries seem to be substituting away from labour and 
adopting relatively more capital intensive technology! In addition, we find that industries, 
which are more dependent on external finance, see a decline in investment in the post-
delicensing period. 
 
Table 7 a: Investment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 1 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Delicensing 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.66***  0.94***
 [4.97] [3.94] [4.62] [5.33]  [7.33]
Infrastructure Dep* Delicensing  0.06   0.06
 [0.77]   [0.70]
Labour Intensity*Delicensing  -0.224   -0.41***
 [1.55]   [2.96]
External Finance Dep*Delicensing -0.94***  -1.18***
 [3.59]  [4.91]
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 1361 1361 1361 1361  1361
Number of Industries  44 44 44 44  44
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72  0.72
 
Dependent variable is log real invested capital.  Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 




Table 7 b: Investment Post-delicensing—Results from Equation 2 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gross value added (log)  0.85*** 0.81*** 0.88*** 0.71***  0.73**
 [36.17] [25.27] [26.53] [10.28]  [8.19]
Delicensing*GVA 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.004 0.02***  0.01
 [4.29] [2.69] [1.51] [3.47]  [1.58]
Infrastructure*GVA 0.16**   0.12*
 [2.23]   [1.69]
Infrastructure* Delicensing*GVA  0.001   0.004
 [0.21]   [0.73]
Labour Intensity*GVA  -0.06*   -0.038
 [1.76]   [1.05]
Labour Intensity*Delicensing*GVA  0.01*   0.007
 [1.74]   [1.57]
Financial dep*GVA  0.36**  0.28
 [2.34]  [1.64]
Financial dep*Delicensing*GVA  -0.02**  -0.02*
 [2.22]  [1.76]
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 1361 1361 1361 1361  1361
Number of Industries  44 44 44 44  44
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90  0.90
 
Dependent variable is log real invested capital.  Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
IV D: Robustness of Results  
 
We do extensive tests for the robustness of our results. These include checking the 
robustness to different time periods, to omitted variables, and to potential outliers. We 
account for the lags between policy and implementation; and also the possibility that the 
outcomes might be correlated by the industries or by the year of delicensing. While we do 
obtain small variations in coefficients and in the standard errors across these different 
specifications, overall the results are quite robust to various sensitivity tests. One result, 
which does seem a bit sensitive to some of the corrections for autocorrelation, is the 
result on infrastructure dependence. In some of the corrections for autocorrelations, the 
coefficients of the interaction between infrastructure and delicensing become less 
significant, but even here its effect holds at about the 20 per cent level of significance. 




Though in the methodology used here the omitted variables that vary only by industries 
or only by year have been accounted for through the respective fixed effects, the 
estimates remain susceptible to the omission of variables that vary over industry-year 
dimensions of the data. In particular, there might have been the following two types of 
omissions: first, the interaction of delicensing with industry characteristics other than the 
ones included; and second, the interaction of policy variables other than delicensing and 
their interactions with the industry characteristics included. 
 
We explicitly control for only one of the major policy changes pertaining to Indian 
industries -delicensing. What about the other policy changes? In order to address these 
concerns we carry out two robustness tests.  First, to control for the reforms which were 
more generic rather than specific to industries, we include in our regressions interaction 
of industrial characteristics with a post-1992 dummy. Second, we construct a trade policy 
measure which is industry-specific and interact it with industrial characteristics. Results 
that are dependent on infrastructure and external finance, and labour-intensive industries 
that have not benefited as much from reforms are fairly robust across these various 
specifications. 
 
While we are unable to conduct these tests for some of the other reforms, the results are 
unlikely to change. The reason is that the reforms are highly correlated over time and 
across sectors. Thus, even if we get a somewhat different coefficient when we include 
interaction of industry characteristics with different reforms instead of delicensing, the 
basic message we want to bring home, that without sufficient infrastructure development, 
financial depth and progress on factors inhibiting labour intensive industries, Indian 
industry is unlikely to realise its potential would hold. For this argument it is really 
immaterial what kind of reforms we are talking about. Second, if we include the 
interactions of industry characteristics with different reforms measures, e.g. delicensing 
and trade reforms, in the same specification, then the coefficient for a particular policy 
measure would become weaker and probably even lose their statistical significance. Such 
a specification will be of little use since again the interest is in a composite reform 
measure rather than specific reform measure. Thus, even if the coefficients might be 
biased in the benchmark specification, to the extent that we do not really care about 
attributing it to delicensing per se, we are fine.  For omitted industry characteristics we 
include other industrial characteristics in the regressions, such as export intensity or FDI 
intensity, interacted with delicensing and find the results to be robust. 
 
We report results for some of the robustness tests in Table 7. The reported results are for 
the dependent variable log value added. In order to address the concerns related to 
autocorrelation we reduce the sample length to the period from 1980 onwards, Column 1, 
Table 7. We can restrict the period further but then we would start losing our control 
period. In the results reported in Column 2 of the table we calculate the standard errors 




Table 7 c: Robustness Tests (Dependent Variable is log value added) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  1980s and 













Delicensing 0.71***  0.9*** 1.1***  0.62***  0.95***  0.93** 
 [4.69]  [5.12] [8.41]  [3.18] [7.80]  [2.86] 
Trade openness      1.04*** 0.72***     
     [6.33] [3.46]     
Infrastructure* Delicensing  -0.22**  -0.18* -0.18***  0.03  -0.23***  -0.18 
 [2.57]  [1.83] [2.62]  [0.29] [3.43]  [1.37] 
Labour Intensity*Delicensing  -0.45***  -0.51** -0.60***  -0.30*  -0.50***  -0.51*** 
 [2.97]  [2.32] [4.08]  [1.94] [3.38]  [4.26] 
External Finance*Delicensing -0.94***  -1.2*** -1.37***  -1.09***  -1.11***  -1.22 
 [3.52]  [3.80] [6.21]  [2.88] [4.97]  [1.57] 
Infrastructure*Trade openness      -0.41*** -0.45***     
     [5.26] [5.01]     
Labour Intensity*Trade openness      -0.05 0.03     
     [0.97] [0.55]     
Financial dep*Trade openness      -0.52** 0.13     
     [2.01] [0.36]     
Industry FE  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1056  1361 1299  1056 1056  1361  1361 
Number of Industries  44  44 42  44 44  44  44 
R-squared 0.67  0.71  0.68 0.69  0.71  0.71 
 




We also drop two industries, tobacco and petroleum (these industries typically show extreme 
measures on various accounts such as labour productivity and size) in column 3 and the 
results are unchanged. In Columns (4) and (5) of Table 7 we include the trade reform 
variable. Here as expected we find that the trade reforms have had a growth enhancing effect 
on Indian industries, and again the effect has varied across industries along the same 
dimension as we have seen in the earlier tables. 
 
To control for the fact that there may be a lag between reform and actual implementation or 
the effect of the reform is felt with a delay, in Column 6 we lag the delicensing dummy by 
two years. In other words, if an industry was delicensed in 1991, we assume that the effect 
was felt two years later, i.e., 1993 onwards. Our benchmark results hold qualitatively. 
 
Section V: Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have analysed the performance of registered Indian manufacturing sector in 
India using data from the ASI.  In line with some recent studies, we find that industrial 
performance has improved with industrial delicensing. However, our analysis also indicates 
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the response of industries to policy reforms. In 
particular, the industries more dependent on infrastructure; industries with greater 
dependence on sources of external finance to the firms; as well as those with high labour 
intensity have not performed well. 
 
From a policy perspective, the important question then is what features of India's policy and 
institutional landscape explain this pattern?  The ongoing policy debates in India suggest 
several leading candidates.  In the case of infrastructure dependent industries, the inadequacy 
of public provision of infrastructure is probably the main culprit. Similarly, the failure to 
improve the Indian financial sector's ability to identify and finance creditworthy firms and 
investors may well lie behind the relatively weak performance of industries especially 
dependent on external finance. 
 
A complementary analysis of two firm-level surveys of managers in the manufacturing sector 
lends further support to these arguments, especially in the case of infrastructure and finance.  
Taken together, the results of the World Bank's investment climate survey and ICRIER 
survey of labour-intensive manufactures support the notion that weak provision of 
infrastructure and finance has constrained the growth of the manufacturing sector. 
 
As regards the weak performance of labour-intensive industries, certain elements of India's 
labour regulation may well be an important causal factor as argued by a number of observors 
of the Indian economy. In particular, certain elements of the IDA may have raised 
significantly the effective cost of hiring workers, thereby hitting the relative profitability of 
labour-intensive industries disproportionately.  Since this is more likely to be the case for 
larger firms (due to the nature of the regulations), labour regulations may have led to 
relatively weaker performance of labour-intensive industries in two ways: first, by 




However, other factors cannot be ruled out -- such as the policy of reserving a whole range of 
labour-intensive products for production by small-scale firms as recently as 2001.  One way 
to make headway on this issue -- i.e., establishing whether certain elements of the policy or 
institutional framework are causal drivers of the pattern of industrial performance we find -- 
is to extend our analysis to the state level. To the extent that India's states present sufficient 
variability in the provision of infrastructure and finance and in the stance of labour 
regulations (as they actually apply to firms and not just on paper), carrying out this analysis 
at the state level should be very useful. We take up this issue in our forthcoming work. 
 
In the meantime, our econometric analysis has served to highlight from where relatively 
weaker performance in India's manufacturing sector is coming.  Unlike previous work that 
has highlighted mainly the role of labour regulations in influencing industrial performance, 
our econometric results interpreted in conjunction with perceptions of managers suggest that 
steps to improve infrastructure and the financial system should go a long way in improving 
manufacturing performance.  Additionally, our results also point to the urgency of identifying 





Appendix A: Data Sources and Construction of Variables 
 
We have primarily used ASI data at the three digit level. After the concordance from NIC87 
and NIC70 into NIC 98 classification, we have data on 49 industries. Data are available from 
1973-2003. Data in general seems good and comparable pre- and post-1998, when there was 
a change in the sampling framework.  The following industries were excluded from the 
analysis. The first three (dressing & dyeing of fur, saw milling, and publishing) were 
excluded because of lack of data on infrastructure dependence from CMIE.  The others that 
were dropped included processing of nuclear fuels and reproduction of recorded media. As 
noted by Aghion et al. (2006), processing of nuclear fuels is likely to be affected by non-
economic factors and hence we drop them from our sample. Finally, reproduction of 
recorded media was introduced as a new category in 1998. There is no data for this industry 
for the period between 1973 and 1998 and is, therefore, excluded from the sample. As the 
table below shows, we exclude less than 1 per cent of the registered manufacturing sector, 
whether we look in terms of employment or gross value added. 
 
Table A1: Industries not included in the sample  
 
Industry  Percentage Share in value 
added in 2004 
Percentage  Share in 
employment in 2004 
Dressing and Dyeing of fur,  articles   0.001  0.01 
Saw Milling  0.02  0.1 
Publishing 0.8  0.6 
Reproduction of recorded media  0.02  0.03 
Processing of Nuclear Fuels  NA  NA 
 
Analysis from here onwards, when it refers to total manufacturing output, employment etc., 
refers to the registered manufacturing excluding the above five industries. The real values 
have been calculated by using respective WPI deflators (unless otherwise noted, e.g. for the 
capital formation or capital stock variables).  
 
Table A2: Construction of variables 
 
 
Variable Data  Source  Description/construction 
Value  added  ASI  It is increment to the value of goods and services that is 
contributed by the factory and is obtained by deducting the 
value of total input.  
Workers (blue 
collared) 
ASI  Blue-collared workers are defined to include all persons 
employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or 
not, and engaged in any manufacturing process or in cleaning 
any part of the machinery or premises used for manufacturing 
process or in any other kind of work incidental to or connected 




Variable Data  Source  Description/construction 
Total 
employment 
ASI  Total employment is defined to include all blue-collared 
workers as defined above and persons receiving wages and 
holding clerical or supervisory or managerial positions or 
engaged in administrative office, store keeping section and 
welfare section, sales department as also those engaged in 
purchase of raw materials etc. or production of fixed assets for 
the factory and watch and ward staff. 
Capital  Stock  ASI  Sum of fixed capital and physical working capital.  Fixed 
capital represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned 
by the factory and covers all types of assets, new or used or 
own constructed, deployed for production, transportation, living 
or recreational facilities, hospitals, schools, etc. for factory 
personnel. Physical working capital includes all physical 
inventories owned, held or controlled by the factory as on the 
closing day of the accounting year such as the materials, fuels 
and lubricants, stores etc. 
Capital 
Formation 
ASI  It represents the excess of fixed capital at the end of accounting 
year over that at the beginning of the year. 
Number of 
factories 
ASI  Factory for the purposes of ASI is defined as the one which is 
registered under sections 2m ( i ) and 2m ( ii ) of the Factories 
Act, 1948. Broadly, according to these sections, premises 
whereon 10 or more workers with the aid of power or 20 or 




ASI  Ratio of Value Added to Total Employment 
Labour 
intensity 
ASI  Labour intensity:  (employment/real invested capital)*1000. 
Where deflator used is the WPI for the NIC classification 319 




CMIE  Ratio of distribution and power & fuel expenses to gross value 




ASI  Ratio of outstanding loans to invested capital, averaged over 
1991 to 1995. 
Export 
Intensity 
CMIE   Ratio of total foreign exchange earnings to GVA. 




Nominal Rate of Protection 
 
 
                                                  
23 Results do not depend on the deflator used or whether we use only fixed capital, rather than invested capital 
which included working capital as well to define labor intensity. It is not surprising since the correlation of 
the WPI series is of the order of .94 with the WPI for electrical goods; and the correlation of fixed capital 
with invested capital is of the same order of magnitude.    
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Table A3: Summary Statistics of the ASI data 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Log (Number of Factories)  1361  6.86  1.42  1.39  21.74 
Log (Total Employment)  1361  11.11  1.31  6.996  14.31 
Log (Blue Collared Workers)  1361  10.81  1.36  6.38  14.18 
Log (White Collared Workers)  1361  9.68  1.23  5.84  12.92 
Log (Real Gross Value 
Added) 
1361 17.88 1.42  13.94  21.74 
Log(Real Invested Capital)  1361  18.76  1.51  14.36  22.65 
Log(Productivity) 1361  6.77  0.75  4.62  9.95 
Size-Log (Labour per Factory)  1361  4.25  0.70  2.85  6.94 
Size-Log (Gross Value Added 
per Factory) 
1361 11.02 1.09  8.30  14.71 
Infrastructure Dependence  44  0.30  0.25  0.04  1.17 
Financial Dependence  44  0.52  0.48  0.04  3.27 















1   
Total number of industries 
delicensed: 13 
meat, fish, fruit, vegetables etc.; leather; paper; 
plastic products; glass; metal products; 
office/computing machinery; electric motors; other 
electric equipment; electronic components; 
television; radio transmitters; medical appliances 
and motor vehicle. 
1989 251 








Total number of industries 
delicensed: 42 
dairy products; grain mill products; other food 
products; beverages; spinning, weaving; other 
textiles; knitted fabrics; weaving apparel; articles of 
fur; footwear; wood products; publishing; printing; 
processing of nuclear fuels; basic chemicals; non-
metallic; iron and steel; basic precious/non-ferrous 
metals; fabricated metal products; insulated wire 
and cable; accumulators, cells/batteries; optical and 
photographic equipment; watches; ships and boats; 
railway locomotives; transport equipment nec; 
furniture; and manufacturing nec. 
1993 293 




Total number of industries 
delicensed: 45 
saw milling; recorded media; and refined petroleum 
products. 
 
















151  Meat, Fish, Fruit,Vegetables etc.  1  0  0 
152 Dairy  Products  1  1  1 
153  Grain Mill Products  1  0  1 
154 Other  Food  Products  1  0  1 
155 Beverages  1  1  0 
160 Tobacco  Products  0  0  1 
171  Spinning, Weaving and Finishing of Textiles  1  1  1 
172 Other  Textiles  1  0  1 
173  Knitted and Crocheted Fabrics  1  0  1 
181 Wearing  Apparel  0  0  1 
191 Leather  Products  except  footwear  1  0  1 
192 Footwear  1  1  1 
202 Wood  Products  1  1  1 
210  Paper and Paper Products  1  1  0 
222 Printing  0  0  1 
231 Coke  oven  Products  0  0  0 
232 Refined  Petroleum  Products  1  0  0 
241 Basic  Chemicals  1  1  0 
251 Rubber  Products  1  1  0 
252 Plastic  Products  1  1  0 
261  Glass and Glass Products  1  1  1 
269 Non-metallic  Mineral  products  1  1  0 
271  Basic Iron and Steel  1  1  0 
272  Basic Precious & Non-ferrous Metals  1  0  0 
281 Metal  Products  0  0  1 
289 Fabricated  Metal  Products  1  1  1 
293  Domestic Appliances, Electric Lamps & 
Equipment 
0 0  1 
300  Office, accounting and Computing Machinery  0  0  0 
311  Electric Motors, Generators & Transformers  0  1  0 
313 Insulated  Wire  and  Cable  0  1  0 
314  Accumulators, Cells & Batteries  0  0  0 
319 Other  Electric  Equipment  0  0  1 
321 Electronic  Components  0  1  0 
322  Television, Radio Transmitters etc  0  1  0 
331  Medical appliances and Instruments  0  0  1 
332  Optical Instruments & Photographic 
Equipment 
0 1  0 
333 Watches  &  Clocks  0  1  0 
341  Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Parts and 
Accessories 
0 1  0 
351  Ships and Boats  0  1  0 
352 Railway  Locomotives  1  0  1 
353  Aircraft & Spacecraft  0  0  0 
359  Transport Equipment nec  0  0  1 
361 Furniture  0  1  1 
369  Manufacturing not elsewhere Classified  0  0  1  
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0.19 1    
Exports  
Intensity 
0.16 -0.08  1   
Import intensity  -0.31**  0.02  0.18  1 
Labour Intensity  0.05  -0.29*  0.25  -0.48***  1 
FDI Intensity  -0.43**  -0.08  0.06  -0.16  0.17 
 
Note:  
Authors’ calculation.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** indicates significant at 5%; *** indicates 
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